"One key element in improving economic efficiency is corporate governance which involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. […] If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global capital market, and if they are to attract long-term 'patient' capital, corporate governance arrangements must be credible and well understood across borders."** One aspect of the relationship between the company's management and its shareholders is far from being well understood: How is this relationship affected if the single company is transformed into a parent company of a corporate group? In Germany, this topic has attracted the most vivid legal interest for some decades, but it is not even considered in other countries -neither in the context of corporate governance nor in the one of corporate groups. One reason might be that provisions concerning corporate groups are not perceived as a distinct body of law in most of these countries***.
I. The framework A. The starting point: the classical model of the company
Traditionally, company law -not only in Britain, but virtually all over the world 1 -assumes any company to correspond to the model of an individual autonomous corporation 2 . A company (we may call it P Co) is perceived as a separate legal entity with its own economic business interests to pursue and a simple structure, composed of two constitutional organs, the board of directors and the general meeting of shareholders 3 . The first of the typical features 4 that we should distinguish is the separate legal entity 5 . P Co is in law a separate person from its shareholders and as such capable of enjoying and being subject to legal rights and duties 6 . This feature is the precondition for P's very existence: "A company exists because there is a rule (usually in a statute) which says that a persona ficta shall be deemed to exist and to have certain of the powers, rights and duties of a natural person." 7 Secondly, the limited liability. Not necessarily linked with the concept of a separate legal entity 8 , this concept does by no means relieve the company of its liability 9 . P Co's liability for its various debts is unlimited, which may lead to a complete exhaustion of its assets in case of an insolvent liquidation. P Co's shareholders, however, are under no obligation to its creditors beyond their obligation on the par value of their shares 10 . Finally, the autonomous organisational structure. Being an artificial person, P Co's use of its legal capacity depends on rules attributing acts of natural persons to it 11 . Any company law must contain such rules providing authority to bind the company externally and competence to take decisions internally.
Most company laws recognise at least two organs 12 : the board of directors manages the company and makes business policy decisions and the general meeting of the shareholders as a body elects the board and decides on certain fundamental corporate changes 13 .
B. The recognition of the phenomenon of corporate groups
This model of the single company has to be contrasted with the economic reality characterised by the rise of corporate groups. They consist of legally independent but economically associated companies 14 . For example, P Co may hold all (or at least the majority) of the shares in another company, S Co. The parent company P Co and its subsidiary S Co form a corporate group.
Albeit this structure is fairly simple, it gives rise to complicated legal issues: "The group enterprise has created problems for the law which have not yet been solved" 15 .
The recognition of the corporate group in various branches of law
When tackling those problems, the law may recognise the corporate group by taking account not of the legally separate company, but of the economically connected group as a whole 16 . This has been done by a variety of legal branches in a number of circumstances.
One example is tax law in many countries 17 . There is a wide range of situations where special national rules exist for the taxation of profits of companies forming part of a group 18 , and on the European scale the parent-subsidiary directive abolishes the withholding tax on cross-border profit distributions within a group 19 . This attitude of tax law is due to the idea that it should be neutral with respect to a business being conducted through a number of legally separate companies or through divisions of one company 20 . The neutrality can be ensured by introducing reliefs for losses, dividends, gains and the like 21 or by requiring a consolidated tax return for the group 22 -the latter treating the corporate group more rigorously as a unit.
However, tax law does by no means recognise the corporate group under any circumstances. In many regards each group company is still regarded as a separate entity, particularly in international taxation. For instance, the Californian approach of Unitary Taxation 23 treating the corporate group as one entity has been regarded as being in complete breach of international principles of income taxation.
Accountancy law went further 24 : the national laws implementing the seventh company law directive of 13 June 1983 are based on the idea of the corporate group as one single unit 25 . The obligation to draw up consolidated accounts has the purpose to show the profitability and solvency of the group without looking at the separate legal entities of each of the associated undertakings. This is not a recent development: in Britain, the need for rules coping with the group enterprise was considered as early as 1904 26 . Competition law also recognises the corporate group to a large extent 27 . When determining whether a merger is deemed to arise, the decisive question is -at least in the German 28 , French 29 , English 30 and European Merger Regulation 31 -whether there is common control or dominant influence. Hence little attention is paid to the legal separation, economic connection is the decisive criterion. The recognition of the corporate group can be found in a wide variety of other branches of law such as labour law 32 , insolvency law 33 or even criminal law 34 . The law of the corporate group defined as the sum of all those rules recognising the corporate group by ignoring the separate legal personality of its parts is hence an "atomised" 35 branch of law. Its rules are spilled over the entire legal system. The scale of this recognition differs, however, not only from one 21 See n 21 supra. This is also the UK approach, see Shipwright/Keeling, ´Textbook on Revenue Law´, 1997, 615 et seq. 22 As in the US, see Shipwright/Keeling, n 25 supra, 551. In France, companies can opt for this regime under certain cirumstances, see Cozian, n 21 supra, 284 et seq., Guyon Laws´, 1982, 230. 24 Farrar, n 2 supra, 474, claims that this is for less need for precision and certainty in this context. 25 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, n 3 supra, 470. 26 Farrar, n 2 supra, 529. 27 Guyon, n 26 supra, 148. 28 §23(2) GWB 29 Order of 1 December 1986, Art. 39. See Guyon, n 26 supra, 148. 30 s65 Fair Trading Act 1973. See Farrar, n 2 supra, 614-7. 31 Art. 3 Council Regulation 4064/69, OJ 1989 L 395. 32 For Germany see Immenga, n 20 supra, 90; for France Merle, n 16 supra, 690 and Guyon, n 26 supra, 147. 33 country to another, and not only within the same legal system, but even within the same legal branch 36 .
Corporate groups in UK company law
In the context of company law, the discussion of the corporate group is mainly focused on the risk that the interests of the subsidiary might be subordinated to those of the holding company or of the group as a whole. This might cause a loss of the subsidiary as a separate entity, possibly causing prejudice to minority shareholders and creditors. Company law can respond in different ways to this risk 37 . It can legitimate the formation of the group and the exercise of influence thereby implemented, but offer means of compensation for the risk of injury incurred, either to the subsidiary itself or to its shareholders and creditors 38 . On the other hand, it can put its emphasis on the interests of the separate entities and protect those interests, during the very formation as well as during the existence of the group. UK company law has chosen the second path 39 , and it provides mechanisms of protection which will briefly be outlined.
a) The formation of the corporate group
The risk of a possible prejudice to the interests of creditors and minority shareholders arises first when a corporate group is formed. The acquisition of a substantial shareholding in the company by another company might result in their ending up in a disadvantaged position due to a possibly detrimental influence of the parent. Some mechanisms aim to prevent possible prejudice at this stage, already, particularly for minority shareholders, but to some extent also for creditors of the future subsidiary.
The rules governing substantial acquisitions of shares are primarily governed by the "City Code on Mergers and Take-overs" (hereafter Code) as well as by the statutory provisions of ss428-430F Companies Act 1985 (hereafter CA). The Code is not specifically designed to prevent the mentioned risks but to provide an orderly framework within a bid may be conducted protect the shareholders by giving sufficient time and information to consider 46 , and the opportunity to express their views on the matter 47 . The overall effect is to protect shareholders against ending up in an unwanted minority position in a corporate group where their interests might be prejudiced 48 , mainly by giving them an opportunity to sell their shares and by providing them with sufficient time and information to take such a decision. S430A and s430B CA have a similar effect at a later stage: if the bid was successful and the offeror owns at least 90% in value of the shares the remaining shareholders can require the offeror to acquire their shares on the terms of the offer 49 . There are some shortcomings of the protection, though. The provisions will have a limited effect where shareholders are dispersed and not especially wellinformed 50 and they do not apply to all target companies as most private companies are excluded 51 . Finally, the Code by its very nature pays little attention to creditors whose interests might also be prejudiced. On a very limited scale, its provisions might nevertheless be advantageous for them: the directors of the target company are obliged to consider also the creditors' interests when giving advice to the shareholders 52 . If the credit contract provides for a possibility to terminate the contract in the event of a change of control, the disclosure provisions of the Code might help the creditor to take advantage of this clause 53 . Some other mechanisms having similar protective effects can only be mentioned here. The rules applicable to a scheme of arrangement, which could be used to form a group of companies, might protect potential minority shareholders 54 by its disclosure and majority requirements 55 and especially by the need of the court's approval 56 . They might also protect the future subsidiary's creditors by providing certain rules for disclosure and creditors' meetings, but also by the power of the court to make an ancillary order under s 427(3)(a) to transfer their liabilities to the future parent company in the course of a reconstruction. Another mechanism for shareholders to protect against ending up in a minority position in a subsidiary, though not a 46 mandatory one, is to impose in the company's articles restrictions on the transfer of shares 57 which might turn out to be the only protection at this stage for shareholders in small private companies not falling under the Code.
b) The existence of the corporate group
Within an existing group, we should distinguish the mechanisms protecting minority shareholders and those protecting creditors, both facing the risk of detrimental influence of the parent company. The mechanisms are found in some of the most complex areas of English company law: rather than studying the details, we will illustrate some important points by looking at an example.
(1) Minority shareholders P Co is the parent company of the subsidiary S Co, which is not wholly owned but has a minority shareholder, C. He seeks for remedies in the following situation: P Co uses its control over S to make the latter sell its products to P at a price below market value.
One remedy that C might invoke is an action on behalf of S Co in respect of the wrong done to this company 58 . Such a derivative action, regarded as the only true exception 59 to the rule in Foss v Harbottle 60 , requires fraud on the minority and wrongdoer control of the subsidiary 61 . By definition almost, the latter will easily be established, as opposed to the former. Leaving apart such difficulty, the remedy is unsatisfactory for further reasons 62 . The costs of bringing a derivative action are discouraging 63 , despite the courts' attempts to provide some assistance in this respect 64 . Perhaps most importantly, the remedy granted will be in favour of the subsidiary, which means that the value of C's shares will raise accordingly 65 . Depending on his stake in the company, this amount might not even cover his legal expenses 66 Those interests are not limited to strict legal rights, but might include legitimate expectations as to the conduct of the company's affairs, arising from the nature of the company and agreements and understandings between the parties 72 . However, this flexible approach will predominantly be taken in a small, private company, as dissatisfied members of larger private and public companies can sell their shares and withdraw from the company 73 . For this reason, it might already be difficult for C to show that a relevant interest is prejudiced by the pricing agreements 74 . Additionally, the conduct has to be unfairly prejudicial, in the sense of causing prejudice or harm to the relevant interest of the member and also unfairly so 75 . The starting point is to ask whether the conduct is in accordance with the articles and the powers conferred upon the board 76 . Even a lawful conduct may be unfair, however, and not every unlawful conduct is unfair 77 . Most of the cases fall into well-defined, but not closed 78 categories 79 . The one that might apply here is mismanagement of the company's affairs. However, the court will normally be very reluctant to interfere with managerial decisions for two reasons 80 : it is not the competence of the court to resolve such questions and poor management quality is a risk to be taken by the shareholder. 88 See Prentice, n 24 supra, 327 and Schuberth, n 45 supra, 143-5. 89 The court "may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief", s461(1) CA. The most common relief is a purchase order requiring the respondents to purchase the shareholders shares, see Farrar, n 2 supra, 455. 90 As opposed to the one in the derivative action, see supra, text to n 69. 91 S122(1)(g) IA, giving jurisdiction to wind up companies on the just and equitable ground can only be mentioned here. It is not redundant, though, as there may be cases where this section is applicable even if a petition on unfairly prejudicial grounds would fail. See Farrar, n 2 supra, 457. 92 The definition in paragraph 3.12. includes any person who either controls 30% or more of the voting rights or is able to control the appointment of the voting majority of directors. Parent companies will generally fall under this definition. associated persons, the voting right of those persons being excluded. These rules have the general effect to avoid that the subsidiary's business is conducted in the interest of the parent company or of the group rather than in the subsidiary's own interest 93 . Particularly, a situation as in our example will not arise where these rules apply, furthermore providing that transactions with the controlling shareholder must be at arm's length and on a normal commercial basis. Indirectly, it is the minority shareholder who benefits of the independence of the subsidiary maintained by these rules.
(2) Creditors
The latter mechanism will equally protect the subsidiary's creditors. Where, however, the parent exercises detrimental influence some other mechanisms might prevent possible prejudice for them.
English courts adhere rather strictly to the principle laid down in the case Salomon v A. Salomon and Co. Ltd 94 over 100 years ago, preventing the subsidiary's creditor to reach the assets of the parent company: "Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities"
95
. However, the courts have occasionally departed from that principle, but it seems impossible to find a general rule as to when the corporate veil will be pierced 96 . There have been some decisions where the separate corporate entity has been disregarded in the context of corporate groups 97 , but only in very exceptional circumstances to hold one group company liable for the debts of another 98 . In this situation, the courts are particularly reluctant to pierce the corporate veil 99 -and they certainly will not do it only because of the fact that the debtor is a subsidiary, even if it is a wholly-owned one 100 . An important new means of creditor protection is provided, however, by the wrongful trading provision, s214 Insolvency Act 1986 (hereafter: IA) 101 . In case of an insolvent liquidation, the liquidator is enabled to obtain a court order that directors are liable for the debts of the company. A proof of dishonesty is not required 102 , but the liquidator must establish that there was a moment in time when the director "knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation" 103 . S. 214(7) extends the liability to a shadow director defined as "a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to act"
104
. This might cause the liability of the parent for the subsidiary's debts, provided that the former is a shadow director of the latter. This was first discussed in Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd by Millett J 105 . Where it is established that the board of the parent as a collective body gave instructions to the subsidiary's directors and that the latter were accustomed to act in accordance with those instructions, the parent company is a shadow director of the subsidiary 106 . Instructions are given if the directors are directed "how to act in relation to the company"
107
. This requires more than the majority control of the subsidiary or even holding all its shares 108 , but it remains to be seen whether resolutions in the subsidiary's general meeting can be regarded as such instructions, especially where it is vested with extensive decision powers. To prove this requirement 109 -and the one of "accustomed to act" -might be difficult. Single directions are not sufficient, but there must be a regular practice over a period of time and a regular course of conduct 110 . Even if all those requirements are established, liability under s214 IA will be excluded where the parent "took every step with a view to minimising the potential losses" 111 . Another mechanism to protect the creditors are the disability rules enabling a company in liquidation to recover property by disallowing particular transactions to stand or certain types of claims 112 . For example, transactions at an undervalue entered into by a company which is insolvent during a certain period prior to the liquidation may be challenged. The interesting feature of those rules in the context of corporate groups are the modifications that apply for connected persons 113 : not only are the relevant periods prolonged, but the effectiveness of the rules is enhanced by the operation of certain presumptions. As 102 As opposed to the fraudulent trading provision of s213 IA. For the complex definition of connected persons 114 contains not only parent companies controlling one third or more of the voting power of a subsidiary, but also other subsidiaries of the same parent company, these modifications will apply for all intra-group transactions.
C. Conclusion
All mentioned mechanisms are rules of general company law. They generally operate whenever there is detrimental influence regardless whether it origins in a parent company, a controlling shareholder or some other outsider. This does not imply that there are no specific rules with regard to corporate groups in UK company law. Definitions of the terms "holding company" and "subsidiary" are laid down in s736 CA. Originally for accountancy purposes, they were given effect on other issues in 1948. Since the implementation of the seventh directive 115 , a separate definition for accountancy purposes is laid down in s258 CA, echoing the elastic definition of dominant influence and the concept of control contracts used in German law 116 -as opposed to s736 et seq., characterised by precise and detailed legal criteria and a series of supplements to avoid possible loopholes. Broadly, the latter applies where one company either controls or holds the voting rights in another company or, as a member, has the right to appoint or remove the majority of its board of directors. For the purpose of some provisions, the notion of "group" is defined as a holding company together with its subsidiaries 117 . Yet the scope of these definitions is very restricted. Leaving disclosure purposes apart their function is twofold 118 : on the one hand, s23 CA prohibits a subsidiary or its nominee from being a member of its holding company. On the other hand, a number of provisions extend certain obligations of companies to certain other members of the group and their directors 119 or, conversely, exempt certain transactions within a group that would otherwise be prohibited 120 . Those are the only provisions where UK company law takes specifically account of the economically connected group rather than of the legally separate company. Hence, there are only rare examples of an express recognition of the corporate group in UK company law. 114 Contained in s249 in connection with s435(6),(10) IA. 115 Its definition of the group is rather broad: mandatory tests based on legal control are accomplished by optional tests on factual control, see Farrar, n 2 supra, 472-4. Prentice 117 Compare ss153(5), 319(7), 333 CA. Schuberth, n 45 supra, 23, is therefore wrong when claiming that no such term is used in English company law. 118 See Farrar, n 2 supra, 535-6. 119 For example, s151 and s330 CA. 120 Compare the exemptions in the loan prohibitions for directors in Part X, for example s333 CA.
The mechanisms described above are not specifically designed for corporate groups, and they never apply merely because of the existence of a group. As was shown above, the mechanisms are only triggered within an existing group if some element of detrimental influence is established. As a conclusion, UK company law does not react to the status of the corporate group, but only to certain patterns of behaviour within a corporate group.
This statement alone, however, does by no means imply that the law is underdeveloped and that the results are unsatisfactory 121 . On the contrary, there may be good economic reasons for group companies to operate as autonomous, independent entities rather than being co-ordinated by interventions of the parent company 122 . Only if the latter policy is adopted, the risk of a possible prejudice for creditors and minority shareholders increases. It is reasonable if protective mechanisms of the law are restricted to this case 123 . The mentioned provisions of the Insolvency Act are a good example for such an approach: the harshest consequence, s 214, applies only if particular detrimental interventions can be positively established. More moderate mechanisms, the disability rules, can be triggered more easily because of the group structure unless it can be established that no such interventions took place, in which case the creditor is left as if he had dealt with an independent company.
But the legal mechanisms might be unsatisfactory in another respect. When focusing on the protection of creditors and minority shareholders of the subsidiary, the discussion in the UK 124 largely fails to notice another impact of the corporate group that will be dealt with in the next chapter. 133 . The particular feature of this approach is the shift of attention from the subsidiary towards the parent company. A strict application of company law rules tailored to the single entity causes a disruption of the legal status of the parent's shareholders and an enhanced scope of the legal powers of its management. To find a remedy for these shortcomings is the purpose of this approach.
II. The focus

An illustration of the approach: the hivedown of a company's business
An example 134 may illustrate these shortcomings. Suppose P Co is originally a single company active in two different businesses: it trades with forest products but also runs a maritime dock. According to its articles, agreed upon by all present members, the company's objects are to run those two businesses, but the company may also form, acquire or participate in other companies and transfer the business to such companies. To run the maritime dock represents the overwhelming part of the actual activity, whereas the trading business has significantly lost importance.
Instead of running the two independent businesses as divisions of one company, the directors of P intend to separate them into two companies. Consequently a new company, S Co, is formed and incorporated. Assets and liabilities related to the maritime dock business are transferred from P to S in exchange for all of its shares. The result of this hivedown is a group structure where P as parent company runs the forest trading business and holds the shares in the whollyowned subsidiary S running the maritime dock business.
X, a shareholder of P Co, is not satisfied with the hivedown by which the main profit centre of P had been transferred out of "his" company. He argues that the company's management had no power to decide such fundamental change of the corporate structure without the consent of the general meeting.
Moreover, he claims that the new structure involves a shift of decision power from P's general meeting to its board. X believes that the new structure enables the directors of P to circumvent the general meeting's right to decide on certain matters. He therefore argues that all decisions requiring a general meeting's resolution in a single company should be "passed-through" to the general meeting of the parent company if they were to be taken in the wholly-owned subsidiary.
The peculiarities of the approach
The arguments of X illustrate the difference to the issues related to minority shareholders in or creditors of a subsidiary who are prejudiced because of the detrimental influence of the parent 135 . Here we face the impact of the group structure on the allocation of power within the (future) parent company 136 . This impact is not confined to its minority shareholders, but concerns the general meeting as a body. Even if X was the only shareholder of P Co, the arguments would not changealthough he will then obviously have means to influence the situation to his favour 137 . The example illustrates that the arising questions are twofold 138 . First, does the management of a company have the power to transform a single company into a parent company or should the general meeting be involved in such decision? This limb of the approach focuses on the formation of the corporate group and is called "Konzernbildungskontrolle" in German 139 . The second limb is concerned with the already existing group structure. Who has the power to take an important decision in the subsidiary? Provided that such decision is vested in the subsidiary's general meeting, who decides about the vote of the parent company as shareholder? This is the second limb's concern, referred to as "Konzernleitungskontrolle" in German 140 , which considers managing and controlling the existing group. 135 
B. "Konzernbildungskontrolle"
Prior to examine the issues of the first limb in more detail, the basic principles of the division of power between the board of directors and the general meeting in German public limited company law require some explanation 141 .
The principles of division of power according to the AktG
The relationship between board and meeting is governed by mandatory provisions of the Aktiengesetz (hereafter AktG) and must not be altered by the company's articles 142 . According to §119(1), the general meeting's power to decide is restricted to cases expressly provided for 143 . The board of directors, on the other hand, has extensive powers to manage the company under their own responsibility according to §76(1) and unlimited authority to bind the company 144 , §78(1) and §82(1). In relation to the company, however, §82(2) imposes a duty to respect the limits set especially by the articles or the general meeting, subject to a relevant competence provided for by the Act.
Hence, the statute provides for a limited power of the general meeting, only competent to decide where such power is expressly conferred to it -and a much wider power of the board, competent in all other cases. This mandatory limitation of the power of the general meeting was introduced by the draftsmen in 1937 to guarantee the independent conduct of business and was maintained in 1965 when a new AktG came into force 145 . Since 1937, the general meeting can thus not be regarded as the supreme organ of the company 146 : it has no power to interfere by particular directions concerning management decisions and the board is autonomous within its own limits of power. The general meeting has no power to elect or dismiss the board 147 , but it is the only body competent to alter the articles 148 .
Is the general meeting competent to decide on the hivedown?
X's first argument would succeed if there was a competence for the general meeting to decide on the hivedown. Such competence might arise on different grounds. First, X might claim a violation of the object clause. Albeit such violation does not make the hivedown invalid -there is no ultra-vires doctrine in German company law -the approval of the general meeting is, according to §82(2), nonetheless required for transactions with the result of the company's activities no longer complying with its object clause. Where the object clause provides only for running a certain business which is then hived down to a subsidiary, it is debated whether this "indirect way" of carrying on the business would still be covered by such an object clause 149 . The objects of P Co, however, include the forming, acquiring or participating in other companies as well as transferring the business to such companies 150 . Notwithstanding the mentioned discussion, at least the present hivedown does not violate P's object clause 151 . X might, secondly, argue that the hivedown falls under §179a AktG 152 requiring the general meeting's approval for the transfer of all assets. But even if the maritime dock represents the overwhelming part of the company's actual commercial activities, the second business of forest trading including the relevant assets remain within the company. The Bundesgerichtshof decided that the provision does not apply if the company is, after the transfer, still able to carry on the business activities as stated in the object clause, even if only on a limited scale 153 . Therefore, a transfer of nearly all assets does not require as such the shareholders' approval. The second argument will fail.
Thirdly, X will argue that, apart from §179a AktG, there are plenty of other provisions requiring a shareholders' approval for decisions similarly implementing structural changes. He will enumerate the formation of a corporate group by contract ( §293 AktG), the so-called integration ( §319(2) AktG) and especially the hivedown of an undertaking as a whole according to § §123 (2) competent by analogy to the mentioned provisions 155 . According to the basic principles of German jurisprudence, however, an analogy to statutory provisions requires that there is a gap in the legislation contrary to the draftsmens' intention 156 -they must have "forgotten" to provide for the respective case. But the problem as arising in our example had already been discussed long before the enactment of the AktG in 1965 157 , and a discussion thereon can even be found in preparatory materials for a statute on a related subject enacted a couple of years earlier 158 . Even when the mentioned UmwG was enacted more than a decade after the Holzmüller decision, the legislator declined to include any provision for exactly that form of hivedown as opposed to earlier drafts of the Act 159 . Consequently, this reluctance must have been on purpose and to draw such analogy is in breach of legal methodology. Therefore, this argument will therefore fail.
As a conclusion, the general meeting of P Co seems not to be competent to decide -bad luck for X?
The first limb of the Holzmüller doctrine
The provision §119(2) provides that the general meeting may only decide management decisions if they are submitted by the board. Whether or not to submit such a question had hitherto been regarded as in the discretion of the board, due to the provision's wording, its function to enable ratifications of breaches of directors' duties and its effect to exclude a respective directors' liability according to §93(4) AktG 160 . Consequently, one would suppose that P's board has the possibility, but no obligation whatsoever to submit the hivedown decision to the general meeting.
In the famous Holzmüller case, based on similar facts, the Bundesgerichtshof ruled, however, that the board had no discretion, but was obliged to submit the decision to the shareholders. "There are, however, fundamental decisions, that, though formally within the power of the board to bind the company, within their power to manage the company's business subject to §82(2) and within the wording of the articles, have such a thorough impact on the membership rights of the shareholders as well as on their property rights embodied in their share capital that the board of directors may not reasonably assume to be competent to take those decisions on their own responsibility without participation of the general meeting" This is the first limb of the Holzmüller doctrine. It is subject to the harshest criticism, less for its result, but foremost for the reasoning: most authors claim that §119(2) does not provide for any obligation of the board and argue that the result should be based on the mentioned analogy 162 . We will come back to the underlying concepts of those arguments. Yet two clarifications as to the scope of the decision need to be made. First this limb of the Holzmüller doctrine is not confined to corporate group issues. The above citation underlines that every fundamental decision might be subject to the doctrine, regardless whether concerning the formation of a group. Whether the rule applies to a particular decision is difficult to determine, if it is not unpredictable: what decisions are fundamental? And which fundamental decisions have a sufficient impact on shareholders' rights to fall under the rule? 163 Even if the first limb of the Holzmüller rule does therefore not only apply in situations where a corporate group is formed, it does, secondly, not always apply in such situations. Obviously there is no need for the rule where the general meeting is competent on other grounds, for example where a hivedown violates the object clause, involves the transfer of all assets or is carried out by virtue of the UmwG. But even if none of those provisions is applicable, the Holzmüller rule will still not apply to all remaining measures resulting in a corporate group structure 164 . For instance, the hivedown of the company's canteen will hardly ever represent a fundamental decision with an important impact on shareholders' right.
Decisions concerning the structure of corporate groups are nonetheless the foremost application of the first limb of the Holzmüller rule, regardless whether the (future) parent hives down part of its business to a subsidiary or acquires or sells the participation in a subsidiary. The fundamental character of most such decisions can only be appreciated by considering their wide-ranging consequences, subject of the second limb of the second limb of the Holzmüller doctrine.
C. "Konzernleitungskontrolle"
We remember X's argument that such structure involves a shift of decision powers from P's general meeting to its board and that he therefore demands a "pass-through" of all decisions in the subsidiary requiring a resolution of the latter's general meeting. This reasoning requires some illustration, first concerning the general idea and then in respect of a specific scenario.
General idea
After the hive-down, P owns all shares in S. Due to further decline in the forest products sector, all substantial economic activity is carried on in the subsidiary, whose business of running the maritime dock flourishes. Every decision that has to be taken in S Co will -according to the division of power outlined above -be taken by S's own board, unless any provision vests the power to decide in S's general meeting.
If such provision applies, who votes in S's general meeting and will therefore effectively take the decision? P's board, on the grounds of its power to manage the company, or P's general meeting, on the grounds that it would have power to decide if the decision was taken in a single company? There is however no express provision vesting this power in P's general meeting and voting for held shares seems to be part of the board's competence to manage the company's business. Consequently, all the decisions in S Co -and, the substantial activity of the group being carried on in this company, mainly all of the group's decisions -will be taken either by the subsidiary's own board or by the parent's one. Hence, the strict application of the statutory competence rules circumvents the decision power of the parent's general meeting, weakening the legal position of its shareholders 165 -albeit economically, the situation in this group resembles a single entity: "Important decisions are in this fashion transferred along with the transferred asset from the parent to the subsidiary." 
The increase of share capital
The example of an increase of S Co's share capital reveals harsh consequences of this problem. Say S has a share capital of 500 Euro (500 shares of 1 Euro) and reserves of 500 Euro. The general meeting of S Co decides a capital increase (all the votes casted by the board of the parent) to 1000 Euro by issuing another 500 shares 167 . By special resolution it is decided that the new shares in S Co shall not be allotted to P Co, but to outside investors 168 . Such misapplication of P Co's pre-emption rights will result in S Co no longer being a wholly owned subsidiary and in P Co's stake dropping down to 50%. The dilution of its shareholding implies an important decrease of P Co's influence in the subsidiary. The control over P Co's former business activities is, by virtue of that second step, not only out of reach of P Co's shareholders, but even out of the company's reach -without, in principle, any involvement of P Co's general meeting at all. If the new shares are issued at 2 Euro (equalling the market price), the sum of share capital and reserves will amount to 2000 Euro. The value of P Co's shareholding will remain unchanged at 1000 Euro. But if the issue had been made at a price below market price, the shareholders would even suffer a loss in value. For instance, an issue at par value of 1 Euro would result in a decrease in value of P Co's main asset to 750 Euro.
Within a single company, the shareholders' preemption rights prevent such detrimental share issues and can only be removed by a special resolution. The example shows that this mechanism, tailored to the single entity, does not provide protection for the shareholders of the parent in case of a capital increase in the subsidiary 169 .
The second limb of the Holzmüller doctrine
Should therefore all decisions that would require a general meeting's resolution in a single company be "passed through" to the general meeting of the parent company if they were to be taken in the wholly owned subsidiary?
In the Holzmüller decision, the Bundesgerichtshof answered as follows: "Where the board of directors had transferred the most valuable part of the company's assets to a wholly owned subsidiary formed for this purpose, the parent company is under an obligation to every shareholder to obtain a resolution of its own general meeting concerning increases of the share capital of the subsidiary at a majority that would be necessary for such a measure in the parent company itself" 170 . Hence, the court decided in favour of such pass-through, at least under certain circumstances. Yet two observations need to be made concerning this second limb. First, the reasoning differs from the one in the first limb 171 : here, the Bundesgerichtshof argues that there is a gap in the statutory competences vested in the general meeting. The general meeting is given an "unwritten competence" to decide on the matter, which presents a real departure from the hitherto mandatory division of power described above and is conceptually rather different from the approach in the first limb, based on a duty of the directors to submit the decision to the general meeting. Secondly, many questions were left open by the court, particularly which decisions have to be passed through. The rule is not restricted to share issue decisions 172 . However, it was held that not every question to be decided by the subsidiary's general meeting had to be passed through, minor amendments of the articles for example being excepted 173 . Furthermore, it was left open whether the reasoning would change had there been prior approval of the hive-down 174 . Hence, the scope of the second limb is unclear 175 .
D. The different concepts of the approach
Instead of discussing further ramifications, we will examine the judgement's underlying concept which differs to an important extent from the one proposed by Lutter.
The concept of the court: a protective mechanism
Regardless of the different legal reasoning in the two limbs of the Holzmüller decision, there is one common, underlying theme. It is discernible in the first limb, where only those fundamental decisions with sufficient impact on the shareholders' rights have to be submitted and also in the second limb where not all decisions have to be passed-through. The criterion is always a possible impact on the shareholder's legal position, on his rights as a member of the company. In the second limb, this impact is direct and immediate: the preemptive right of the parent's shareholders, for example, is undermined by the share issue as such. Albeit the decisions examined in the first limb do not have such direct and immediate impact they are nonetheless the basis for a later undermination of the shareholders' position by decisions of second-limb-type. Hence, the whole reasoning of the court is based on a possible impact on shareholders' rights 176 . Consequently this approach aims to provide a protective mechanism (insofar similar to the mechanisms described in Chapter I), in this case for the benefit of the parent's shareholders.
The concept of Lutter: the organisational approach
A fundamentally different concept underlies the approach of the Lutter School, which the court considered but declined to comment 177 . The group is regarded as a functional unit of several legal entities. Such functional unit or "corporatio sui generis" 178 is a business organisation in itself and raises similar questions as normal companies -it has to be founded, financed, managed and supervised, it has to resolve internal conflicts of interests between its members and finally it has to be dissolved 179 . Yet the corporate group as a legal phenomenon is claimed to blast the rules of traditional company law 180 -as, for example, but not only, in the Holzmüller scenario. Hence jurisprudence is attributed the task to prepare rules specifically tailored to the functional unit of the corporate group -instead of applying the rules of general company law that this academic school regards as unable to cope with the phenomenon 181 . When trying to develop such rules for the decisionmaking of the group, Lutter refers to general "principles of the private organisational law" 182 , Those categories are then applied to the corporate group, in order to furnish this functional unit with a pattern of internal organisation 185 . The first three categories are attributed as follows: management and control are within the competence of the board of directors of the parent company. The accounting is vested in the management bodies of each subsidiary and the parent company. The question remaining is "who, within this corporate group is vested with the fundamental decisions, hence who decides on its formation, enlargement, restructuration and liquidation"
186 . Lutter points to the shareholder meeting of the parent as competent body 187 . In organisations such as the partnership or the private limited liability company -and, to some extent also the public company -the members' meeting is considered as the competent body to decide upon such fundamental decisions. Albeit not provided by the draftsmen, it is argued that one should regard such attribution as a principle of every private organisation and therefore applicable to the corporate group as well 188 . Hence, the general meeting of the parent company has the function of a "supreme body" of the corporate group, responsible for all fundamental decisions within the group. E. Why "organisational law" of the "polycorporate enterprise"?
The latter approach overcomes the protectionist concerns of the traditional law of corporate groups and has a broader, though debatable concept 189 . Whereas the former approach tried to protect different stakeholders in the corporate group, this concept regards the group as one functional unit and looks for an organisational, institutional framework for this unit.
That explains the title of this paper: First, the term "organisational law" is to be understood in the sense of rules providing for an internal organisation structure of 183 190 . To determine such structure, to attribute powers to the group's bodies becomes an end in itself, no longer aiming to provide for a protective mechanism. This approach is not restricted to the separation of powers of management and owners, but also tries to find a "group interpretation" of the functions of all the different bodies within this group 191 . Secondly, the approach does no longer consider the corporate group as the sum of independent companies, but as an independent, autonomous body 192 , itself attracting interest as a legal phenomenon rather than the elements it is composed of. 35 years ago, Ludwig Raiser called this functional unit a "poly-corporate association" 193 , which is an excellent description underlining both the unity and the diversity of such a functional unit 194 . "Poly-corporate" stands for the diversity, due to the multiple companies -still legal entities -that it is composed of. The companies resemble atoms, capable to form a complex structure, a molecule, if grouped together 195 . This molecule is regarded as different from its composing atoms, revealing a uniform structure as functional unity. "Association" stands for this unity, a consequence of the economic reality that groups are being led as one business organisation 196 . To avoid any impression of equal partnership between its members (that might arise by using the term "association"), which is absent within such groups, often organised like a hierarchy, the present writer chose the term "enterprise" instead.
The time is ripe to trace such "organisational law of the polycorporate enterprise" in various legal systemsa task that Lutter himself strongly supports: "There is barely another field of law that is better suited for a common European development by jurisprudence than the law of groups of companies, since groups of companies are realised to a great extent across the barriers of national borders; no national legislation has yet found a complete system but in all of them we can find fruitful approaches, which can be put together to a Ius Commune Europae of groups of companies" 197 .
III. In search of traces in other jurisdictions
Curious to trace those fruitful approaches, we will first look for comparable legal discussion and then focus our research on one particular, but crucial aspect of the organisational law of the polycorporate enterprise, the "Konzernbildungskontrolle". We will consider which body of the company is competent to take what will simply be called 'fundamental decisions' from now on: decisions of fundamental structural changes, such as the transformation into a future holding company or the acquisition or sale of important participations.
A. In search of a comparable legal discussion
However, this search seems disappointing. Apart from Austria 198 and Switzerland 199 , any discussion in this respect is virtually absent. In the US, an interesting article was published by Eisenberg 200 as early as 1971, later included in his book "The Structure of the Corporation" 201 . Since then, the issue seems to be forgotten. In Britain, Prentice 202 became aware of the problems and underlined the importance of dealing with them: "failure to do so would result in shareholder control being circumvented where a company carried on its business through subsidiaries" 203 . His discussion, hardly covering two pages, dates back to 1982 -the problems have apparently never been tackled again in the UK. In France, finally, despite some interesting approaches to the problems of corporate groups 204 , the distortions in the parent seem to be overlooked -with exceptions to which we will return later.
But our disappointment gives rise to new questions: why are those problems not discussed? Are they overlooked, not existing or already solved?
B. In search of the power to decide on "Konzernbildung"
We try to find answers by considering the competence to take fundamental decisions, a consideration which is, according to the Holzmüller doctrine, not necessarily confined to the group context. Determining such competence requires to examine the relationship between general meeting and the board.
The division of power
Under UK law the articles determine the relationship and confer certain powers of management to the board 205 . The conceptual difference to the German view of the company is striking: the "organisational law" even of the single entity is not governed by mandatory rules but determined by the company's articles. The company is regarded as an organisation constituted by fundamental decisions 218 . This is interesting: even where doubts about the respective competence of the board had arisen in other countries, this question of wording is never considered. Under current French law, it is beyond doubt that the board of directors has, in principle, such competence.
Notwithstanding the important conceptual differences, we can conclude that X would be in a similarly unsatisfactory position had the hivedown taken place in a company with "standard" articles under the law of any of the mentioned jurisdictions -reason enough to consider his arguments.
Possible arguments against the board's competence a) Violation of the object clause
The argument that the structure did no longer comply with the company's object clause for the business being carried on through a subsidiary did not succeed because the clause included, inter alia, the participation in other companies carrying on such business. In the absence of such clause, however, the hivedown would presumably 219 violate the articles 220 and require prior modification by the general meeting.
In the UK, such clause is equally necessary: "Were it not for the practice of conferring express powers on companies to acquire shares in other companies [...], it would not be possible for one company to be the holding company of another" 221 . In those states of the US that have adopted the respective provision of the Model Business Corporation Act 222 , the power to acquire shares is expressly granted. Otherwise, such authority can be derived from the implied powers of the corporation, unless for the acquisition of shares in companies pursuing different business purposes 223 . In both countries, companies thus regularly have the power to held shares in other companies.
Strictly speaking, this is not yet a reply to the argument that the hivedown violates the object clause because the business is no longer carried on by the company itself, but by its subsidiary. This is not a question about ultra vires, but about whether not to pursue an object intra vires could be regarded as contrary to the memorandum. In spite of -or maybe because of -the long and complex history of the ultra vires doctrine in the UK, this question apparently has never given rise to any discussion. The reason might be the object clause's traditional function to limit the company's capacity 224 accordance with the clause might simply be subject of internal redress. Hence its function is similar to an "internal guideline" for the directors -and it makes little difference whether they decline to do what they are told or whether they do what they are not told to do. Given this difference, the first argument is very unlikely to succeed under UK law. Rather different is the position under French law: having all powers of a natural person 226 , the company's power to held shares is beyond doubt. It was, however, quite early discussed whether the company may indirectly pursue its objects by acquiring shares in another company and no longer carrying on such business itself. This was accepted by the majority view 227 , implying that, in case of the hivedown, the argument would not succeed. For other fundamental decisions like selling shares in a subsidiary, this might be different. In Dauphiné Libéré 228 , it was held that the sale of all shares in the only subsidiary violated the parent's object clause, in spite of an express clause allowing the participation in companies carrying on specified businesses. According to the court, the "real and only" object was the control of that particular subsidiary and could no longer be pursued if those shares were sold. However, in Bouygues c/ Patrimoine participations 229 , such sale was held to be consistent with the object clause allowing the "participation of any kind and in any form". We will return to the latter case, but can already conclude that under French law, even where a company's articles contain such participation clause, the directors cannot automatically assume to have competence to decide on fundamental changes, due to the court's possibly strict approach.
b) Particular statutory provisions
X's further arguments were both linked to particular provisions vesting certain decisions in the general meeting, provisions which can also be found in other jurisdictions.
First, certain reorganisations are subject to the meeting's approval. In the UK, such approval is required where the business is transferred to another company in the course of a liquidation (s110 IA) or by scheme of arrangement (s425 CA). The former differs from a hivedown in that it involves the winding-up of the transferor company. If the business is transferred by way of scheme of arrangement, particularly by division of a public company according to s425A CA in connection with Sch 15B, the shares of the transferee company in return of which the business is transferred are receivable by the members of the transferor company. Generally, any transfer under those provisions implies that the shareholding of the members of the transferor company changes: instead of 226 or additional to shares in one company, they end up with shares in another company. This is the fundamental difference to structural changes such as the hivedown, where merely the assets of the company change, consequently not requiring any arrangement between the company and its members 230 . It is the company which ends up with shares in another company instead of its business assets.
The same reason generally prevents the French provisions about "scissions" 231 (divisions) to apply. But there is one interesting peculiarity: according to Art. 387 loi 1966, the transfer of a part of the company's assets to another company in exchange for shares of the latter receivable by the former -thus including hivedowns -can be made subject to the "scission" provisions by agreement of both companies, then requiring the approval of the transferor company's general meeting 232 . But even this provision does not help X, because there is no obligation for the board to conclude such agreement.
Secondly, and perhaps to greater benefit for X, provisions require the general meeting's approval for important changes in the company's assets, similar to the "transfer of all assets" rule in §179a AktG.
French law contains such provision in art. 396 loi 1966. Albeit apparently only applicable to liquidations, the courts applied the provision in the absence of such liquidation 233 and extended its scope considerably including the transfer of "nearly" all the assets 234 . In Bouygues c/ Patrimoine participations 235 , for example, the general meeting was held to be competent on this ground -a striking conceptual difference to the Holzmüller decision.
Many American state laws have a statutory "sale of substantially all assets" rule 236 , but it would not apply to a Holzmüller-type hivedown for two reasons 237 . The term "sale" refers to transactions resulting in the disposal of the transferor's interest in the transferred business, whereas the (future) parent retains this interest indirectly 238 . Moreover, not "substantially all" assets were hived down 239 .
No such rule exists in Britain, despite several proposals. Hadden proposed to require shareholders' approval for all "major disposals or acquisitions, whether by take-over or the purchase of assets, for major investment programmes and for ventures into entirely new spheres of activity" 240 -a very wide formula indeed, reversing much of a company's adopted reversed roles -a surprising, somewhat confusing observation. That confusion might stem from a common lack of a doctrine of directors' duties comparable to the British one 249 , which gives continental lawyers "great intellectual pleasure to study its different facets and admire the skill of the judges to adjust it to our present expectations" 250 -and perhaps also a remedy against their confusion! However, there is presumably no breach of any of the two indicated duties' equivalents under British doctrine. Neither are we concerned with careless conduct which may give rise to a breach of their duty of care and skill, nor with any loyalty conflict such as misuse of the directors' position for personal benefit or a conflict of duty and interest or duty and duty.
The duty to act bona fide in the interest of the company 251 might also be considered, the relevant test being one of honesty, of whether or not the directors acted in what they -and not the court -considered to be in the interests of the company. If their intention is to circumvent shareholders' rights like their potential preemption rights such breach might indeed be established, given that the interest of the company also comprises the interests of present and future shareholders 252 . But generally, commercial or tax reasons for the decision will give rise to the directors' honest belief it being in the best interest of the company, prohibiting any argument related to this duty. The duty to act for proper purposes, however, provides objective grounds on which the directors' decision might be reviewed: "[...] an exercise of such a power though formally valid, may be attacked on the ground that it was not exercised for the purpose for which it was granted" 253 . Albeit this duty had often been synthesised with the requirement to act bona fide, recent cases establish the independence of the proper purpose doctrine for the revision of the exercise of directors' powers. It has been said to be the least discussed and the least well understood of the directors' fiduciary obligations 254 , yet it might provide a mechanism to control their power to take decisions of structural change. Still, most cases related to the company's internal composition concern share allotments.
To transfer this approach to "Konzernbildungskontrolle" decisions requires some deal of speculation.
"Konzernbildungskontrolle" via the proper purposes doctrine?
The first consideration relates to the power on which the decision is based. Even though involving enterprise. First, even for the single company no other
